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Eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys compromised by weak randomness

Security & privacy Disclosure · Real-world · Unit 42

The claim

The authors assert that eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys were generated with insufficient randomness, enabling attackers to derive the keys and issue fraudulent TLS certificates.

Unit 42 · Unit 42 Writeup

Published as: “EMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates Compromised”

So what

Compromised intermediate CA keys enable attackers to forge trusted TLS certificates, creating a risk of widespread man-in-the-middle attacks against any services that trust those CAs.

The five-minute version

The blog reports that eight intermediate CA private keys from eMudhra were generated with insufficient randomness, allowing key derivation. This weakness lets attackers forge TLS certificates and perform MitM attacks against any domains trusting those intermediates. Major browsers and OS vendors have begun revoking or untrusting the affected CAs, and Palo Alto provides mitigation guidance and product features.

What they found 2

What undercuts it the paper’s own results

What’s new here 4

Artifacts & methods 2

Topics

certificate authorityprivate key compromiseinsufficient randomnessTLS man-in-the-middlecertificate revocationcertificate transparencyPKI governance
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