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Steering plugins can hijack LLM outputs with up to 97.8% success while keeping safety refusals

Security & privacy Attack · Prototype · arXiv

The claim

Malicious steering plugins can covertly manipulate LLM behavior with high attack success and minimal impact on safety performance

Yu Yan, Jiahao Chen, Siqi Lu, Yongjuan Wang, Ziming Zhao, Zhaoxuan Li, Qingjun Yuan · arXiv Paper PDF

Published as: “Steering for Safety, Hijacking for Profit: Trojan Threats in the LLM Activation Steering Supply Chain”

So what

Steering plugins can be weaponized to covertly steer user decisions toward specific brands while appearing to improve safety, highlighting an urgent need for supply-chain and runtime protections.

The five-minute version

The IDH malicious steering plugin can achieve an attack success rate of up to 97.8% while still preserving high safety-refusal rates, and a runtime Scrubbing defense cuts that success rate by about 80%. The paper demonstrates these results across five mainstream LLMs, six brands, and three commercial domains, but also shows that pure hijacking without the safety component sharply reduces refusal rates.

What they found 2

What undercuts it the paper’s own results

What’s new here 4

Artifacts & methods 6

Topics

Activation SteeringSteering PluginsTrojan/Backdoor AttacksNorm-Gated RoutingInflection Point LocalizationRuntime Defense (Scrubbing)Supply-Chain SecurityLarge Language Models
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